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ABUSE OF RIGHTS IN FRANCE AND QUEBEC*
Albert Mayrand**
The expression "abuse of right" is open to criticism. According
to Planiol, it is a barren "logomachy".1 A right is always in conform-
ity with the law; the exercise of a right cannot be against the law.
What we call an abuse of right is essentially an excess of right.2 All
rights have limitations;3 when a person under the pretense of exercis-
ing an actual right goes beyond the sphere of that right, it is said that
he has committed an abuse of right. His right ceased where the abuse
began. A person's right to stretch his arm, stops at his neighbor's
nose. If he goes an inch further, it could be said that he has commit-
ted an abuse of right. It might be simpler to call this a tort or a
negligent act. In a recent judgment of the Quebec Superior Court, the
distinction between the exercise of the right of picketing during a
legal strike and illegal acts committed by the pickets was expressed
this way:
(translation)
[V]iolence, intimidation, trespass and riot cannot be considered
as "abuses of the right" of picketing. The latter is a right; the
former are violations of the law on the occasion of the exercise of
the right.4
* This article is based on a presentation and round-table discussion at a seminar
of Louisiana Appellate Judges held on Feb. 1-2, 1974 under the auspices of the Institute
of Civil Law Studies of Louisiana State University. A list of the abbreviations used
appears in the Appendix.
** Judge of the Superior Court of the Province of Quebec and member of the
Quebec Civil Code Revision Office (now a judge of the Quebec Court of Appeal-Ed.).
The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful cooperation of Prof. Paul A. Cre-
peau in the English translations which appear in this article.
1. 2 PLANIOL, TRAITI 9LMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL no. 871 (9th ed. 1923).
2. Scholtens, Abuse of Rights, 75 S. AFR. L.J. 39, 49 (1958).
3. Exceptionally some rights are held to be absolute. A classical example is the
right of the parents to refuse their consent to the marriage of their minor child. How-
ever, a father who had withdrawn his consent to the marriage of his minor son was
condemned to pay damages to his son's fiancee, because the withdrawal of his consent
was inspired by a spirit of vengeance. Civ., May 21, 1924, D. 1924.1.97. Louis Josserand
notes: "Le groupe de ces prerogatives sourveraines et asociales se r~tr&it de plus en
plus." Id. at 98. The Civil Code Revision Office of the Province of Quebec proposes
the following rule: Art. 28-Report on Family Law: "If the opposition [to marriage]
is dismissed, the opposant may be condemned to pay damages, according to the cir-
cumstances."
4. Canadian Gypsum Co. Ltd. v. Conf~ddration des Syndicats, [1973] Que. S.C.
932, 936: "[L]a violence, l'intimidation, l'empittement et l'meute ne peuvent tre
consid~r~s comme des 'abus du droit 'de piquetage. L 'un est un droit; les autres des
contraventions d la loi dont l'exercise du droit n'est que l'occasion." The Court of
Appeal has reversed this judgment (Jan. 31, 1974): "To the extent that there is a right
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The above criticism is not without merit; the expression "abuse
of right" is perhaps an abuse of language. However, it is a very con-
venient phrase and is commonly used in civil law countries. Scholars
are still going to employ the term, but the main problem is to know
exactly what is meant by it. There are indeed circumstances when a
person, being technically within the limits of his right, does not exer-
cise it in conformity with its nature or with the purpose contemplated
by the law or by the contracting party when that right was created.'
The theory of the abuse of rights existed and was applied centu-
ries before it was given a name and formally recognized. As early as
1577, a wool comber indulged in singing continuously while working,
for the sole purpose of annoying a neighboring attorney. It was held
that his songs were more harming than charming and that he had
made an abusive use of his right to sing. He was condemned to pay
damages.'
Until the beginning of this century, the theory of abuse of rights
occupied a modest place in the field of law. Its real starting point was
property law. Moreover it was restricted to cases where the owner had
exercised his right maliciously. Those two frontiers or limitations
(property law and malice) were soon removed. From property law, the
abuse of rights theory spread to other fields including administrative
law and even the law of contract. Malice, which was at first a sine
qua non condition of the abuse of rights, gave way to simple fault
which has a much wider scope. Some persons even consider that, in
certain cases, fault is no longer a prerequisite.
The evolution and the spread of the theory of abuse of right has
followed a similar pattern in France and in the Province of Quebec.
Until recently, Quebec courts did not accept the application of the
theory in the law of contracts. Recent decisions are doing away with
this last limitation and it can be said that there is now much similar-
ity between French and Quebec jurisprudence.
I. THE ABUSE OF RIGHTS IN EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL MATTERS
(a) The Abuse of Right in Property Law
The right of ownership was the natural cradle of the theory of
abuse of rights. Why is this so? The right of ownership has always
been considered as absolute. It has been defined by the Quebec Civil
Code in the following terms:
to picket, this right must, like any other right, be exercised so as not to interfere with
the rights of others."
5. Crabb, The French Concept of Abuse of Rights, 6 INTER-AMERICAN L.R. 1, 9
(1964).
6. 2 MAZEAUD ET TUNC, TRAT9 THOORIQUE Err PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSABILuT no. 556
(5th ed. 1957).
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Ownership is the right of enjoying and of disposing of things in
the most absolute manner, provided that no use be made of them
which is prohibited by law or by regulation.'
A similar provision is found in the Louisiana Civil Code:
Perfect ownership gives the right to use, to enjoy and to dispose
of one's property in the most unlimited manner, provided it is not
used in any way prohibited by laws or ordinances...s
Article 667 of the Louisiana Civil Code limits what is described
as an almost unlimited right in article 491 of the same Code:
Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he pleases,
still he can not make any work on it, which may deprive his
neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may be the
cause of any damage to him
This article solves for Louisiana the problem of abuse of the right of
a proprietor to make a work on his estate, by fixing clear limits to that
right. In a way, it is narrower than a general rule on the abuse of
rights, because it provides a solution for a particular case; in another
way, it is wider than a case of abuse of right, because it comprises
cases where a damage is caused without any fault. Neither the French
nor the Quebec Civil Code has a similar article; the owner of an estate
in those two countries, has a right which is described as "absolute."
This qualification is an echo of the Roman Law which recognized
three prerogatives of the owner: jus utendi, jus fruendi, jus abutendi.
In connection with this last prerogative, the right to abuse, it should
be noted that abutere is stronger than "to dispose." How was this
right to abuse turned into an abuse of right? The Latin expressionjus
abutendi meant that an owner had the right to damage or destroy his
own property; it did not mean that he had the right to use his prop-
erty to damage his neighbor. However, being the undisputed master
of his property, it was natural for the owner who has a grudge against
his neighbor to exercise his right of ownership in a manner causing
damage to him. Were the courts to remain indifferent and allow an
owner to cause damage by malice without awarding compensation to
his victim?
According to the common law of England a right is a right no
matter what is in one's mind when one exercises it. This absolutist
view of rights was well expressed in the case of The Mayor of Bradford
v. Pickles:
7. (Emphasis added.) QUE. Civ. CODE art. 406. See also FR. CIv. CODE art. 544.
8. (Emphasis added.) LA. Civ. CODE art. 491.
9. LA. Civ. CODE art. 667.
1974]
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No use of property which would be legal if due to a proper motive
can become illegal because it is prompted by a motive which is
improper or even malicious.'"
In support of this rule, it has been argued that it is too difficult to
discover the true intent of a person exercising his right, because it
involves an investigation of a psychological nature;" the heart of man
is impenetrable!
The difficulty in the matter of proving malice does not appear
to be a very good reason; whenever proof of malice can be made, the
law should take it into consideration. This is done everyday in crimi-
-nal law in those cases where the mens rea is an element of the crime.
It is also done in private law where the rights of a contracting party,
of an occupier or a possessor, vary according to his good or bad faith.
If a person does something on his property which is not useful to
himself but injures another, the presumption is that he acted with the
intention to injure,'2 because he is supposed to know and accept the
normal consequences of his acts. It is comforting to read the following
statement in a comment on abuse of rights in Louisiana:
The principle that an act which is lawful in itself cannot be made
actionable because of the motive which induces it, is a legal plati-
tude honored more by exception than by application.'3
Examples of the abusive exercise of a right of property are quite
common in both French and Quebec jurisprudence. One such exam-
ple in France is the case of a fake or dummy chimney constructed on
the top of a roof; it served no practical or aesthetic purpose but was
erected for the sole purpose of interfering with the neighbor's view
and shutting out air and light from an important window of his home.
Although the defendant's property was not a servient estate charged
with a servitude, the court found that he had exercised his right of
ownership in an abusive manner and ordered the demolition of the
fake chimney."
Another example is the case of the dirigible balloons in France:
Plaintiff was experimenting with airships; his neighbor erected in his
10. [1895] A.C. 587 (H.L.). The defendant abstracted the water percolating
under his soil in order to prevent its reaching the plaintiff's reservoir and compel him
to buy his land. See also Sorrell v. Smith [1925] A.C. 700 (H.L.); Allen v. Flood
[1898] A.C. 1 (H.L.); LA. CiV. CODE art. 661; QUE CiV. CODE art. 503; Fa. CiV. CODE
art. 644.
11. Gutteridge, Abuse of Rights, 5 CAMBRmE L.J. 22, 26 (1933).
12. Scholtens, Abuse of Rights, 75 S. Aix. L.J. 39, 43 (1958).
13. Comment, 7 TUL. L. REv. 426 (1932).
14. Colmar, May 2, 1855, D. 1856.2.9.
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field high wooden scaffolds equipped with iron spikes in order to
render the experiments dangerous and force the plaintiff to buy his
land.'5 In Quebec, the same high spirit of opposition inspired the ex-
director of an air transportation company who, having not been ree-
lected, erected high posts on the land adjoining the airport, for the
purpose of rendering its operation hazardous.'" There is also the
Quebec case of Brodeur v. Choiniere," in which the owner erected a
fence eight and a half feet high along his neighbor's property, for the
purpose of depriving him of air and light, while pretending falsely
that his purpose was to prevent his hens from invading the land of
his neighbor. This case offers a good example where the malicious
intent is deduced from all the circumstances of the case and where
the predominating motive reveals an animus nocendi.
When the exercise of a right is a mere pretext to cause damage
deliberately to somebody, it is difficult to argue that no liability is
incurred. Thus, when a person engages an orchestra to play loudly
every time his neighbor organizes a hunting party, not for the love of
music but for the sole purpose of scaring the game, he really commits
a tort or a delict camouflaged under the right to play and enjoy
music.'8
The courts in France and Quebec thought that it was impossible
to refuse a remedy to the victim of a malicious act, and it is through
this wide open door that the abuse of rights theory entered the civil
law. But judges have to give reasons for their judgments, and those
reasons must be based on legal rules. The reason given to justify the
application of the abuse of rights theory could be summed up in the
following proposition: He who exercises his right maliciously commits
a fault and incurs delictual liability according to article 1053 of the
Quebec Civil Code:
Every person capable of discerning right from wrong is responsi-
ble for the damage caused by his fault to another, whether by
positive act, imprudence, neglect or want of skill.'"
Once the theory of abuse of rights found itself comfortably
15. Coquerel v. Clement-Bayard, Req., Aug. 3, 1915, S. 1920.1.300, D.P.
1917.1.79; Trib. Compi~gne, Feb. 19, 1913, D.P. 1913.2.177.
16. Air Rimouski Lte v. Gagnon, [1952] Que. S.C. 149. See also Blais v. Giroux,
[19581 Que. S.C. 569; Laperri6re v. Lemieux, [1958] R.L. 228. In both cases, a high
and ugly fence had been erected for the sole purpose of depriving the neighbor of light
and depreciating his property.
17. [19451 Que. S.C. 334.
18. Amiens, Feb. 7, 1912, D. 1913.2.177.
19. QUE. CIv. CODE art. 1053. See articles 2315 (1) and 2316 of the Louisiana Civil
Code which correspond to articles 1382 and 1383 of the French Civil Code. "Every act
19741
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settled on article 1053 of the Quebec Civil Code or article 1382 of the
French Civil Code, it could not rest with the malicious intent limita-
tion. The fault contemplated in that article does not require malice.
Any fault, voluntary or involuntary, gross or slight," malicious or not
malicious, renders its author liable for damages caused.2
The substitution of the criterion of fault for the criterion of mal-
ice (animus nocendi) is well illustrated in the jurisprudence relating
to the abuse of the right to repudiate a promise of marriage. Although
it is sometimes disputed,22 the general opinion in Quebec law is that
a reciprocal promise of marriage does not create the obligation to
execute that promise." However, the right to make a promise of mar-
riage or to repudiate a promise of marriage must not be exercised "d
la lkgre", inconsiderately. A breach of a promise of marriage may be
reasonable, in which case no damage is due. It may also be prompted
by malice or by simple fault, in which case it is an abuse of the right
to repudiate the promise.24
Every one has the right to express his opinion on events or on
persons. However this free speech and free expression must not be
exercised maliciously or even imprudently. It has often been held in
our courts that good faith is not in itself a good defense for libel or
slander. 5
The right to sue in court is considered as a sacred right; the right
to litigate or to use legal process is ancillary to individual freedom;
legal remedies must be available to every one ex debitojustitiae6 and
no one can validly waive this right. When a litigant loses his lawsuit,
judges say that fie did not have a good case; the party who loses his
case loses also the time he has spent in Court and in his lawyer's
office, he loses the costs27 and he sometimes suffers damage to his
whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened
to repair it .. "LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315. "Every person is responsible for the damage
he occasions not merely by his act, but by his negligence, his imprudence, or his want
of skill." Id. art. 2316.
20. See the signification of these terms in Louisiana Civil Code article 3556 (13).
21. 1 MAZEAUD ET TUNC, TRArTg TH9ORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSABILIT no.
576 (5th ed. 1957).
22. Mayrand, Rupture de fianqailles, [1963] R. DU B. 1.
23. A. Er R. NADEAU, TRAIT9 PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSABILIT9 CIVILE DgLICTUELLE no.
197 (1971).
24. Id. no. 198; Riom, March 26, 1941, S. 1941.2.45; Req., June 23, 1938, Gaz. Pal.
1938.2.586.
25. A. ET R. NADEAU, TRAiT PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSABILITI CIVILE DILICTUELLE no.
238 (1971), (except in the case of an absolute or a qualified privilege); Bddard v.
Paquette, [19651 Que. B.R. 483.
26. The Queen v. Osborn, [1971] S.C.R. 184, 190 (Ontario).
27. QUE CODE CIv. P. art. 477.
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prestige; but even if he caused a great inconvenience to the person
he sued, he is only condemned to pay the taxable costs. This is the
fair price one has to pay for the exercise of the right to contend in
court for justice. The other costs and inconvenience suffered by the
successful defendant are a dam num sine injuria, a damage which is
not the result of a violation of the law. If the plaintiff would be liable
in damages every time his action is dismissed, this would prevent free
access to the courts.
It is not an abuse per se to go to court even if one is not absolutely
sure of his right and cannot foresee the outcome of the case." How-
ever, it becomes an abuse when the litigant, knowing very well that
he has no case, institutes legal procedures with the sole purpose of
harming the other party. A vexatious procedure may be entered in
order to destroy a person financially, politically or professionally.
Everyone has the right to prosecute, but no one has the right to
persecute. Malice for some time was considered as the condition sine
qua non of the action in damages for false accusations or abusive
institution of legal proceedings. At first, it was thought in Quebec
that English law ought to be applied in this matter because the right
to use legal process is a part of public law." But the jurisprudence is
now settled: ancient French law applies in Quebec to the abuse of the
right to sue in court. Malice is not an essential element of the action.
When a litigant has taken action which he should have known to be
unfounded, he commits a fault and he is liable for damages caused
to the defendant or to the accused.
French courts have decided that the right to appeal from a judg-
ment is also subject to being abused.3' In Quebec, the legislator has
endorsed the theory of abuse of right in the case of frivolous "ap-
peals." Article 524 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure allows the
Court of Appeal to condemn an appellant to damages when it dis-
misses an appeal "that it considers dilatory or abusive." French
courts have also decided that a creditor may make an abuse of his
right to execute a judgment.2
According to the Quebec Civil Code, the right of the creditor of
28. Ville St-Laurent v. Marien, [1962] S.C.R. 580.
29. Hdtu v. Dixville Butter and Cheese Assoc., 16 Que. B.R. 333 (1907), 40 S.C.R.
128 (1908); Pinsonneault v. Sdbastien, 3 S.C. 446 (M.L.R. 1887); Groth6 v. Saunders,
3 Q.B. 208 (M.L.R., 1886); Copeland v. Leclerc, 2 Q.B. 365 (M.L.R., 1886).
30. Fabyan v. Tremblay, 26 Que. B.R. 416 (1917); Prime v. Keiller, [1943] R.L.
65, A. ET R. NADEAU, TRArrg PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSABILIT9 CIVILE D9gLICTUELLE no.
222 (1971); See however United Steel Workers v. Gaspd Copper Mines, [1970] S.C.R.
362, 389 (no responsibility failing evidence of bad faith or gross error equivalent to
fraud).
31. Req. Nov. 18, 1946, Gaz. Pal., 1947.1.40; Req., June 8, 1931, S. 1931.1.332.
32. Req., Mar. 20, 1929, S. 1930.1.45.
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an alimentary pension to register his judgment as a judicial mortgage
on the immovables belonging to his debtor, is also exercised abusively
if the judgment is registered on several properties without necessity,
in cases where the alimentary pension is abundantly secured by a
single one of them. The debtor may then obtain a judgment limiting
the judicial mortgage and granting a release except for one or two
immovables.33
In France, Josserand suggested that the theory of abuse of rights
ought to be applied when a right is exercised in a way that is incon-
sistent with its natural purpose or its social aim or objective." This
new criterion for the abuse of right has not been adopted by every-
one.35 It is often difficult to identify the social purpose of a right, and
the usual criterion of fault is more easily understood. Moreover, one
may consider that the exercise of a right in a way that is contrary to
its social purpose is precisely a fault, because a bonus paterfamilias
would not exercise his right in such a way.
The application of the theory of abuse of rights to cases where
the person exercising his right was at fault, without having any mali-
cious intent, seemed to be the last stage of the extension of the theory.
It may appear very awkward to hold a person liable for damages when
that person is merely exercising his right in good faith and in a pru-
dent manner. Yet the theory of the abuse of rights sometimes seems
to reach that extreme. This last extension of the theory of abuse of
rights chose as a starting point the use of a right of property or
ownership. Indeed, the right of ownership is in a way the breeding
ground of the theory of abuse of rights.
The following is an example taken from French jurisprudence. A
company was given permission by public authorities to set up and
operate a refinery. In the process of refining oil, it emitted fumes
which polluted the air and caused a nuisance to the neighborhood,
although the company used good and modem equipment." Although
it committed no fault, the company was condemned to pay damages
to its neighbors because the normal exercise of its right to operate a
refinery exceeded the standard of ordinary and reasonable limits of
33. QUE. Cirv. CODE, art. 2036. The article, however, provides for the payment of
the costs by the petitioner.
34. L. JOSSERAND, DE L'ABUS DES DRorrs (2d ed. 1939); 2 CoUrs DE DROrr POSmF no.
438 (3d ed. 1938).
35. ETHIOPIAN CIV. CODE, art. 2034: "Sous r~serve des articles prkcedents, la man-
i~re dont un droit est utilis ne peut tre critiqu~e en faisant valoir qu'elle est contraire
d la destination 6conornique ou sociale de ce droit." Translation: "Under reserve of the
preceding articles, the manner in which a right is exercised cannot be objected to for
the reason that it is contrary to the economic or social function of this right."
36. Req., Dec. 5, 1904, D. 1905.1.77; Req., Apr. 19, 1905, D. 1905.1.256.
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annoyance that neighbors are expected to endure with forbearance.
Of course, a court will take into consideration the district in which
the property is located. The industrial section of a city cannot be as
peaceful and quiet as the suburban residential district; sometimes it
is also relevant that the neighbor, who complains about the inconve-
nience, already had his residence there when the manufacturer estab-
lished himself in vicinity."
The abuse of right without fault had been recognized twelve
years earlier by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec case of
Drysdale v. Dugas.3 The defendant Drysdale had been authorized to
erect and operate a large livery stable on St. Denis Street in Mon-
treal. The plaintiff Dugas who owned an adjoining home suffered
from offensive smells emanating from the stable and from noise
caused by the horses. One dissenting judge of the Supreme Court
would have allowed the appeal and dismissed the action because the
maintenance of the stable was legal and the proof had been made that
it would be "impossible that any such stable could be more perfect
in its construction and in its arrangements and in the manner of its
being conducted. ,39 It is interesting to note that Chief Justice Strong
cited only English authorities, as was then (1895) customary for the
common law trained judges, whereas Justice Taschereau (of Quebec)
cited only French authorities. At any rate, the majority of the judges
decided that although the defendant had "acted with extreme care
and caution" and had been operating the livery stable according to
the municipal by-laws, he was responsible for the serious annoyance
and inconveniences caused to the plaintiff.
Another example of responsibility for abuse of right without fault
is the recent case of Katz v. Reitz.40 During the construction of a large
apartment house, the private residence of a neighbor collapsed. When
the builders of the apartment house were making the excavations
they erected a wall made with wooden beams to support the land of
the neighbor. They acted as any prudent and competent contractor
would have acted. However, an underground pool of water located in
the land of the neighbor percolated through the wooden beams into
the excavation carrying with it part of the soil. Quoting the maxim
"sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas," the court observed that the
builder of the apartment house was obliged to compensate the neigh-
37. Known as the theory of pre-occupation or of priority of activity. Contra, Cass.,
Feb. 18, 1908, D. 1907.1.385, 1907.1.77.
38. 26 S.C.R. 20 (1895), affirming 6 Que. B.R. 278 (1895), 5 Que. S.C. 418 (1894).
39. Id. at 26 S.C.R. 28 (Gwynne, J.).
40. [19731 C.A. 230. For other cases of abuse of right without fault, see Huard,
Le droit de la famile et le droit des biens, 6 R.J.T. 375 (1971).
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bor "even in the absence of fault."
We are here at the meeting point of two theories: the theory of
abuse of rights and the theory of risks (thkorie des risques). The
latter, which is more disputed than the former, may be summed up
in the proposition that he who benefits from an economic activity
must assume the risk inherent in such an activity and pay the dam-
ages caused even without his fault; hence, the duty of the employer
to compensate the workman who is hurt at work even through his own
fault.
(b) The Abuse of Right in Administrative Law
The abuse of rights theory has also been recognized in admin-
istrative law.4" Josserand, the brilliant author of 'De 'abus des
droits, '12 has made the following remarks:
When a public administrator commits a distortion (or misuse,
"d~tournement") of power, it is also at the same time an abuse
of right for which he is liable, with only this difference that the
abuse concerns a right related to the public function and not to
a private function. This difference might have a bearing on the
procedure to be followed, but not on the nature of the recourse.43
The exercise of the right to render administrative decisions is not
governed by all the rules that must be observed for the rendering of
a judicial decision. For instance, the rules of evidence are not followed
as strictly as in a court of justice," as long as the case is handled in
all fairness and according to the rules of natural justice. However, as
a rule, the decision of an administrative tribunal ought to include
supporting reasons unless there is an express provision of law to the
contrary. 5 Since the courts have a general power of supervision over
41. L. DUBOUIS, LA THItORIE DE L'ABUS DE DROIT ET LA JURISPRUDENCE ADMINISTRATIVE
(vol. 45 of the Biblioth~que de droit public Librairie G~n6rale de Droit et de Jurisprud-
ence, Paris 1962).
42. (Paris 1962).
43. DE L'ESPRIT DES DROITS ET DE LEUR RELATIVIT9 no. 194 (2d ed. 1939): "Lorsqu'un
administrateur commet un dtournement de pouvoir, c'est encore, et du mme coup,
un abus de droit dont it se rend coupable, avec cette seule particularit6, que labus
intresse un droit attach6 a ta fonction publique et non point 6 la fonction privke. La
procedure 6 suivre pourra bien s'en trouver influenche, mais non I'essence mime du
recours. "
44. For instance, the right of an interested party to cross-examine a witness may
be refused. See Re Elliott and Governors of the University of Alberta, 37 D.L.R. 3d
197 (1973).
45. Compare Conseil d'Etat, Jan. 26, 1973, D. 1973.606. A judgment of a court
must, as a rule, contain the reasons upon which it is founded. C.C.P. arts. 471, 519.
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political and corporate bodies," the reason of the decision should be
expressed, because otherwise it would be difficult for the supervising
court to determine whether it is the result of an abuse of power.
The power to render decisions given to public boards or public
administrators must be exercised reasonably. Quebec courts and
Canadian courts generally have annulled or reversed decisions ren-
dered against a person who was not given the opportunity of being
heard. The rule "audi alteram partem" is a part of Quebec law;4" the
rendering of a decision without giving the party concerned a chance
to be heard is an abuse of administrative power, unless the law, in
specific cases, allows the ex-parte procedure."
The right to render administrative decisions is exercised abu-
sively when it is rendered for an improper or an irrelevant motive. In
the case of Jaillard v. City of Montreal, a permit to operate a roller
skating rink was refused only because the parish priest was opposed
to it." This was quite an irrelevant motive. In the case of Roncarelli
v. Duplessis, the president of the Quebec Liquor Board had refused
the renewal of a liquor permit to a well known restaurateur, only
because this was the express wish of the prime minister of Quebec;
the prime minister had recommended the refusal of the permit for the
sole reason that the restaurateur was furnishing bail for many Jeho-
vah's Witnesses who were being prosecuted. It was held that the
refusal of the permit for such an irrelevant motive and the recommen-
dation of the prime minister-which was considered as an
order-constituted "a gross abuse of a legal power." The Court found
that "it is not proper to exercise the power of cancellation (of a liquor
permit) for reasons which are unrelated to the carrying into effect of
the intent and purpose of the (Alcoholic Liquor) Act."
46. FR. CODE CIV. P. art. 33.
47. Alliance des Professeurs Catholiques de Montreal v. Labour Relations Board,
2 S.C.R. 140 (1953), reversing [1951] Que B.R. 752. A teachers' union called a strike
in violation of the Public Services Employees Dispute Act, which at that time refused
the teachers the right to strike. The Labour Relations Board, without notice to the
union and without hearing it, cancelled its certificate of representation. Although the
law did not in terms require a notice, it was held that the Board was bound by the
maxim "Audi alteram partem." The decision of the Board was annuled and the writ
of prohibition was granted.
48. Commission des Rel. de Travail du Quebec v. Ingersoll Rand Co., [1968]
S.C.R. 695; Quebec Labour Board v. J. Pascal Hardware Co., [1965] Que. B.R. 791.
49. 72 Que. S.C. 112 (1934), mandamus granted. See also Ville St-Laurent v.
Marien, [1962] S.C.R. 580 where the city had maliciously refused to issue a permit
of construction.
50. [1959] S.C.R. 121, at 141, 156. Compare Re John Gregory Ltd. and Town of
Oakville, 37 D.L.R. 3d 641 (1973) (bad faith of the municipal authority which refused
a construction permit); Re Parisien and Mason, 37 D.L.R. 3d 450 (1973) (refusal of the
renewal of a collection agent licence based on an insufficient reason).
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More recently, it was held that even though a city has the right
to adopt zoning by-laws, it is not entitled to use its discretionary
power to prevent an already established commercial firm from carry-
ing on its business."
The expression "abuse of right" is not used in administrative law
which in Quebec is derived from English law. What is described as
an excess of jurisdiction, gross irregularity or "an abuse of author-
ity," 52 is sometimes a genuine abuse of the right to make decisions.
But the words are relatively unimportant. The fundamental rule re-
mains true: any right, whether private or public, must be exercised
in good faith and not in a way to defeat the purpose for which it was
granted, or in a way to cause a prejudice which could be avoided.
II. THE ABUSE OF RIGHTS IN CONTRACTS
(a) Reasons to Oppose the Application of the Theory of Abuse of
Rights to Contracts
Is the abuse of rights theory applicable in contractual matters?
At first sight, the principle of freedom of contract (and the autonomy
of the will) is opposed to the extension of the theory of the abuse of
rights in the field of contracts. According to the French Civil Code,
article 1134, the contract is the law of the parties. Article 1901 of the
Louisiana Civil Code puts it this way:
Agreements legally entered into have the effect of laws on those
who have formed them.
Then article 1945 of the same Code goes on:
Legal agreements having the effects of law upon the parties, none
but the parties can abrogate or modify them ...
This rule holds even when the agreement is inequitable for one of the
contracting parties. Under such a rule, the clever and experienced
business man is the undisputed master. He is allowed to stipulate
abusive clauses and take full advantage of them against the naive
party. Pacta sunt servanda even if the result is inequitable. The
debtor owes an absolute duty to the creditor, who has an absolute
right to the execution of the contract."
The only general limitation on the principle of contractual lib-
51. Ivanhoe Corp. v. La Ville de Val d'Or, [1973] S.C. 904.
52. QUE. CODE CIv. P. art. 846: "[un abus de pouvoir."
53. This appears clearly from what an English judge said in the case of Chapman
v. Honig, 3 Weekly L.R. 19, 32 (1963): "[A] person who has a right under a contract
or other instrument is entitled to exercise it and can effectively exercise it for a good
reason or a bad reason or no reason at all."
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erty appears in article 13 of the Quebec Civil Code (which corre-
sponds to article 6 of the French Civil Code and article 11 of the
Louisiana Civil Code):
No one can, by private agreement, validly contravene the laws of
public order and good morals.
Louisiana Civil Code, Article 11:
Individuals can not by their conventions derogate from the force
of laws made for the preservation of public order and good morals
But the legislator does not deem an abusive clause of a leonine con-
tract to be contrary to public order or good morals. 5 This results
clearly from article 1012 of the Quebec Civil Code:
Persons of the age of majority are not entitled to relief from their
contracts for cause of lesion only.
The French Civil Code (art. 1313) and the Louisiana Civil Code are
quite similar on this point although they make exceptions for the sale
of immovables and exchange 5 A person of age must assume the
consequences of his lack of wisdom and experience, even of his stup-
ity. This rule has some resemblance with the law of the jungle, where
the fittest and the strongest survive. The court seems to be without
authority to intervene in favor of the weakest. The Louisiana Civil
Code warns them at article 1945 (par. 2):
Courts are bound to give legal effect to all such contracts accord-
ing to the true intent of all the parties.
The contractual right, seen in that perspective, looks at first
sight to be an impregnable fortress barring the way to the theory of
the abuse of rights. How could this fortress be breached? When there
is a will, there is a way; techniques have been found. The simplest
one consists in declaring the contract null because it is contrary to
good morals or public order. A good supply of contra mores or contra
public order dynamite will be used to explode either the whole con-
54. Commercial Acceptance v. Partridge, [1956] R.L. 193 (clause by which the
vendor of a car could repossess the unpaid car and sue the buyer for the balance due
before reselling the car).
55. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1861: "The law, however, will not release a person of full
age, and who is under no incapacity, against the effect of his voluntary contract. ....
Art. 1863: "Persons of full age are relieved for lesion in no other contracts than those
above expressed, except as hereinafter provided regarding the contract of exchange."
Fa. CIV. CODE art. 1313: "Les majeurs ne sont restitu6s pour cause de I6sion que dans
les cas et sous les conditions sp~cialement exprimres dans le present Code."
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tract or only the part of the contract which makes it unjust. The more
sophisticated technique consists in circumventing the contract, using
the little winding path of interpretation to go around it. When those
techniques fail, resort can be had to the theory of abuse of rights.
(b) Techniques Used to Apply the Theory to Contractual Matters
It is appropriate to make an examination of the techniques ap-
plied in France and in Quebec. In all likelihood, similar techniques
may have been applied in Louisiana.
Morality and public order are such indefinite and extensive con-
cepts that whenever a contract is shockingly unjust one feels justified
to say that it is contrary to good morals or to public order. Here are
two examples taken from Quebec jurisprudence. The first is the
clause by which a debtor promises to pay any expenses and fees his
creditor might have to incur for the collection of the debt by an
attorney. The second is the restrictive convenant by which a person
undertakes not to exercise his profession or commerce in competition
with his former employer or the purchaser of his establishment.
The validity of the following agreement has been questioned,
sometimes with success, before the Quebec courts:
If the amount due is not paid and must be placed for collection
in the hands of solicitors, the debtor agrees to pay to the creditor
all expenses incurred therefor including attorney's fees (or: to pay
an additional sum of 15% on the amount of the said collection as
and for solicitors' charges).
Many arguments, not all convincing, have been invoked against the
validity of this clause. Here are some of them:
1. This clause constitutes a stipulation for the benefit of a third
party,5" the beneficiary is the attorney for the creditor, and the credi-
tor is not entitled to claim fees which belong to his attorney (Quebec
Code of Civil Procedure, art. 59: "A person cannot use the name of
another to plead . . .,,).57
2. The object of the obligation (eventual attorney's fees) is not
sufficiently determined or determinable. The disputed clause would
be contrary to article 1060 of the Quebec Civil Code (art. 1886 of the
Louisiana Civil Code or art. 1129 of the French Civil Code):
56. QUE. CIv. CODE art. 1029; FR. Civ. CODE art. 1121; LA. CIV. CODE art. 1890.
57. Modern Refrigeration Co. v. Bastien, [19531 S.C. 347; J.-L. BAUDOUIN, LES
OBLIGATIONS 301 (Les Presses de I'Univ. de Montrbal, 1970): "[E]lle constitue une
stipulation pour autrui en faveur de l'avocat, d'honoraires que la stipulant rclame lui-
mme et dont it acquiert le benefice contrairement 6 la Loi du Barreau."
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An obligation must have for its object something determi-
nate at least as to its kind. The quantity of the thing may be
uncertain, provided it be capable of being ascertained."
3. The clause is contrary to public order, the law establishes a
tariff of legal fees that can be claimed against the debtor condemned
by judgment:
Quebec Code of Civil Procedure art. 480:
The party entitled to costs prepares a bill thereof in accord-
ance with the tariffs in force...
If the debtor is obliged to pay additional costs not provided for in the
tariff, he is charged a double toll, which is contrary to the intent of
the legislator.59
4. The clause is contrary to article 1077 of the Quebec Civil
Code"0 which reads as follows:
Dans les obligations pour lepaiement d'une somme d'argent,
les dommages-intrts resultant du retard ne consistent que dans
l'int~r&t au taux legalement convenu entre les parties, ou en
l'absence de telle convention, au taux fix6 par la loi . . .
The damages resulting from delay in the payment of money,
to which the debtor is liable, consist only of interest at the rate
legally agreed upon by the parties, or in the absence of such
agreement, at the rate fixed by the law...
Article 1935 of the Louisiana Civil Code would be more favorable to
such an interpretation:
The damages due for delay in the performance of an obliga-
tion to pay money are called interest. The creditor is entitled to
these damages without proving any loss, and whatever loss he
may have suffered, he can recover no more.'
58. Posluns v. Berke, [1968] S.C. 255; La Caisse Populaire de l'Universitd Laval
v. Morais, [19701 P.R. 408, 411; Cities Service Oil Co. Ltd. v. Huot, [1965] S.C. 113.
59. Leduc v. Gourdine, 10 L.N. 161 (1887); Rompr6 Fr~re Drive Yourself Lte v.
Roy, [1961] S.C. 29; Traders Finance Corp. v. Dame Leclerc, [1961] P.R. 205; Pos-
luns v. Berke, [1968] S.C. 255; A. Langlais, Tout pacte de payer les frais non taxables
oblige-t-il le d~fendeur?, 1958 R. Du B. 245, 264.
60. Traders Finance Corp. v. Perron, [1967] S.C. 418; T.-L. Bergeron, Des ventes
dites conditionnelles, 22 R. Du B. 150, 157 (1962); Y. Caron, Dommages-intr~ts et
clauses p~nales, 74 R. DU N. 328, 330 (1972). Contra, Bernard Grenier, Dommages-
int~r~ts conventionnels avant pour objet les frais extrajudiciaries, 12 CAHeERS DE VRorr
477 (1973). See also, contra, Les Immeubles Fournier Inc. v. Construction St. Hilaire




Here is a second example of an agreement in which one of the
parties takes an abusive advantage over the other and which the
courts are inclined to annul as contrary to public order. The principle
of contractual liberty allows for a restrictive covenant by which an
employee agrees not to work after the termination of his employment
for a competitor of his employer, or a restrictive covenant by which
a vendor undertakes not to compete with the purchaser of his busi-
ness. The validity of such covenants is not questioned when they are
reasonable, having regard to the legitimate interests of the parties
and of the public. However the abuse of restrictive covenants has led
tribunals to consider them against public order when they go beyond
what is reasonably adequate to protect these interests. They are not
enforceable when they are excessive either as to duration, or place or
scope. 2 It is indeed against public order to deprive a man of the
means to earn his living and to contribute his work and services to
society.
When it is impossible to use the weapon of morality and public
order to defeat the abusive contract, one may sometimes avoid any
inequity by resorting to the interpretation of the leonine contract.
The force of interpretation is such that it may tame a lion and trans-
form it into a domestic pet.
A section of the Quebec Civil Code, under the title of Obliga-
tions, relates to "The interpretation of contracts." 3 The Louisiana
Civil Code64 and the French Civil Code65 have a similar section. Arti-
cle 1019 of the Quebec Civil Code 6 reads as follows:
In case of doubt, the contract is interpreted against him who has
stipulated and in favor of him who has contracted the obligation.
Due to the probably inadvertent omission of a phrase in the 1825
English translation the Louisiana Civil Code states the opposite
rule. 7 In Quebec and French civil law, persons are presumed to be
free of obligations and the same rule applies to property: it is inter-
preted restrictively. 6
62. Pitre v. L'Association Athl~tipue d'Amateurs, 20 K.B. 41 (1911); Cameron v.
Canadian Factors, [1971] S.C.R. 148.
63. QUE. CiV. CODE arts. 1013-21.
64. "Of the Interpretation of Agreements," LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1945-62.
65. "De l'interprdtation des conventions," FR. Civ. CODE arts. 1156-64.
66. This article corresponds to Fa. CIv. CODE art. 1162.
67. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1957: "In a doubtful case, the agreement is interpreted
against him who *has contracted the obligation."
*[Should include "has stipulated and in favor of him who. See 1972 CoMPUED
EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA art. 1957 (J. Dainow ed.). Ed.]
68. Limoges v. Bouchard, [1973] C.A. 791. See also LA. CIv. CODE art. 753:
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Another provision of the Quebec Civil Code, in article 1024,
states that:
The obligation of a contract extends not only to what is expressed
in it, but also to all the consequences which, by equity, usage or
law, are incident to the contract, according to its nature.
The Louisiana Civil Code also refers to equity as a complement of the
express terms of the contract." There is also a good description of
what is meant by equity in article 1965:
The equity intended by this rule is founded in the Christian
principle not to do unto others that which we would not wish
others should do unto us; and on the moral maxim of the law that
no one ought to enrich himself at the expense of another...
This article offers a very convenient support to the theory of the abuse
of rights; the French and the Quebec Civil Codes have no correspond-
ing article.
Unfortunately, it is not always possible to complete the terms of
a contract by implied terms founded on equity. Article 1963 of the
Louisiana Civil Code states the rule:
When the intent of the parties is evident and lawful, neither
equity nor usage can be resorted to, in order to enlarge or restrain
that intent . ..
The natural light that shows the intent of the parties emanates from
the words of the contract. Interpretation is an artificial light which
cannot be used when there is no darkness, no obscurity, no
ambiguity. Therefore, when the wording of a contract is crystal clear,
the resulting rights cannot be disputed or diminished. If they are
harsh, they will cause harshness without remedy and the ensuing
injustice will be clothed in the authority and majesty of Latin max-
ims such as "Dura lex, sed lex"-"Pacta sunt servanda"-"Nullus
"Servitudes which tend to affect the free use of property, in case of doubt as to their
extent or the manner of using them, are always interpreted in favor of the owner of
the property to be affected."
69. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1964: "Equity, usage and law supply such incidents only
as the parties may reasonably be supposed to have been silent upon from a knowledge
that they would be supplied from one of these sources." Id. art. 1903: "The obligation
of contracts extends not only to what is expressly stipulated, but also to everything
that, by law, equity or custom, is considered as incidental to the particular contract,
or necessary to carry it into effect."
70. See also Id. art. 1945(3): "[The intent is to be determined by the words of
the contract, when these are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences."
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videtur dolo facere qui suo jure utitur." Now, it is up to the theory
of abuse of rights to tear down these pompous garments and expose
the naked injustice. But how can it do so legally? If interpretation
cannot render the contract equitable at the time of its execution,
fairness and reasonableness should prevail at the time of its perform-
ance. Both the French Civil Code and the Louisiana Civil Code state
the rule: "Agreements . . .must be performed in good faith." 2 If a
contract may be performed in different manners, one must presume
that the intention of the parties was that it should be performed the
way which is less harmful to the debtor." This is specially true when
the more damaging way of performing the contract does not appear
clearly by its terms. If a party acts maliciously in the performance of
a contract, he violates a rule of law and he therefore commits a fault.
Article 1383 of the French Civil Code and 1053 of the Quebec Civil
Code (corresponding to article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code) will
hold him responsible for the damages resulting from his fault. It is
interesting to observe that the theory of the abuse of rights has been
introduced in the Swiss Civil Code by adding only a few words to
what is in article 1901 of the Louisiana Civil Code. Article 2 of the
Swiss Civil Code reads as follows:
Every one is bound to exercise his rights and perform his obliga-
tions according to the principles of good faith. The law does not
protect the manifest abuse of a right.74
It is generally held that the fault which consists in exercising a
contractual right in bad faith is delictual (extracontractual). How-
ever, it should be possible in many cases to consider it as a contrac-
tual fault. If one considers that the obligation to perform the contract
in good faith is a condition implicitly agreed by the parties, the abuse
71. DIGESTE, bk. 50, tit. 17, fr. 55.
72. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1901 (3). FR. Civ. CODE art. 1134(3): "Les conventions...
doivent tre exkcutkes de bonne foi." The Quebec codifiers did not consider it neces-
sary to state this principle explicitly. A contract must be completed by the rule of
equity and it is a rule of equity that it should be performed in good faith.
73. 7 LAROMBI9RE, THI9ORIE ET PRATIQUE DES OBLIGATIONS no. 11 (1885): "A plus forte
raison, en serait-il tenu (du dommage cause) si, entre diverses mani~res d'exercer son
droit, it avait mchamment et dans le dessein de nuire, choisi celle qui devait ou
pouvait tre Ia plus dommageable." Translation by H.C. Leake in Abuse of Rights in
Louisiana, 7 TUL. L.R. 426, 432 (1932): "A fortiori, one would be held liable for it (the
damage caused) if among the various ways of exercising his right, he had maliciously,
and for the purpose of causing injury, chosen the one which must or might cause the
greatest harm."
74. Swiss CIv. CODE art. 2: "Chacun est tenu d'exercer ses droits et obligations
selon les r~gles de Ia bonne foi. L'abus manifeste d'un droit n'est pas protg# par Ia
loi."
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of a contractual right is in itself a violation of the contract.
In France, the theory of the abuse of rights has been applied to
contracts but the abuse of a contractual right or of any other right is
generally considered as a delictual or a quasi-delictual fault. 5 In
Quebec, until very recently, the courts were reluctant to allow the
application of the theory to contractual matters. They held that the
employer who has reserved the right to put an end to the contract of
employment unilaterally or the lessor who has stipulated that he
could put an end to the lease after twenty-four hours notice, could
exercise his right rigorously without incurring any liability."6
Recently, several judgments of the Superior Courts have ex-
pressed a different opinion. The right to terminate a contract should
be exercised in good faith in such a way and at such a time that it
will not cause unnecessary prejudice."
A good example of the slow introduction of the theory of the
abuse of rights in contractual matters is afforded in the case of leases.
Until January 1, 1974, article 1638 of the Quebec Civil Code provided
that "The lessee has a right to sublet, or to assign his lease, unless
there is a stipulation to the contrary." But it added: "If there is such
a stipulation [prohibiting a sublease] . . . it is to be strictly ob-
served." Article 2725 of the Louisiana Civil Code is to the same ef-
fect."8 The insistence of the two Codes for a strict observation and a
strict construction of the prohibiting clause seemed to be a warning
to keep the theory of the abuse of rights out of this area. As a matter
of fact, the Quebec courts have considered that the contractual right
of the lessor to oppose any sublease is an absolute right; he who
exercises this right does not have to give his reason or justify his
decision. 9 However some judgments made a distinction between an
75. 2 H., L. ET J. MAZEAUD, LEgONS DE DROIT CML no. 461 (2d. ed. 1962); 1 MAZEAUD
Er TUNC, TRAITt TH[tORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSABILIT no. 559 (6th ed. 1965);
Cass., July 18, 1961, J.C.P. I. 1961.12317.
76. Banque Provinciale du Canada v. Martel, [1959] B.R. 278, 299; Trottier v.
McColl Frontenac Oil Co. Ltd., [1953] B.R. 497; Quaker Oats Co. of Canada Ltd. v.
C6te, [1949] B.R. 389.
77. Modernfold Lte v. New Castle Products Ltd., [1973 S.C. 220; Fiorito v. The
Contingency Ins. Co., [1971] S.C. 1; Aluminum Co. v. Syndicat National, [1966]
B.R. 641, 651 (obiter dictum). See D. Angus, Abuse of Rights in Contractual Matters
in the P. of Q., 8 McGILL L.J. 150 (1962).
78. "The lessee has the right to underlease, or even to cede his lease to another
person, unless this power has been expressly interdicted. The interdiction may be for
the whole, or for a part; and this clause is always construed strictly."
79. Kates Ltd. v. Gross Interests Corp., [1970] C.A. 1143; Librairie Concorde v.
Ariss, [1961] B.R. 425, 426, (Mr. Justice Bissonnette expressly refuses to apply the
theory of the abuse of rights); Boyer v. Quintin, [1948] B.R. 400, 402; Mount-Royal
Hotel v. Martin, 41 B.R. 27, 32 (1926); Rosconi v. P6ladeau, 48 S.C. 356 (1915).
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absolute interdiction to sublet and an interdiction to sublet without
the consent of the lessor, in which case it is a conditional interdic-
tion." The purpose of this clause would be to prevent the tenant from
subletting the apartment to undesirable people who could damage
the property. But it would not entitle the lessor to refuse permission
to sublet for no reason at all or for the purpose of causing inconveni-
ence to his tenant.8'
The Civil Code Revision Office of Quebec has opted for this last
formula. In conformity with its recommendation the Civil Code of
Quebec has been modified. Article 1619 now reads as follows:
The lessee cannot sublet all or part of the thing or assign his lease
without the consent of the lessor, who cannot refuse it without
reasonable cause...s8
Then article 1652 states:
Every stipulation inconsistent with articles. . . . 1619 (and oth-
ers) . . . when they apply to the lease of a dwelling. . . is with-
out effect.
This text and many others that have been adopted during the last
few years show that the legislators" join with the courts to inject into
the law the idea that no creditor should exercise his right in a way to
cause an undue prejudice to his debtor. The theory of the abuse of
80. Larocque v. Freeman's Ltd., 50 S.C. 231 (1916); Charbonneau v. Houle, 1 S.C.
41 (1892).
81. Geiger v. Dame Cohen et vir, [1962] S'C. 222 (obiter dictum) (the reasons
for refusing were deemed reasonable); Drozdzinski v. Zemal, [1954] S.C. 163: Veitch
v. Eliasoph, 30 R.L. (n.s.) 138 (1924). See Yves Mayrand, Clauses de sous-location, 5
R.J.T. 151 (1970). Compare Trib. civ. Poitiers, Dec. 1, 1931, D.P. 1932.2.57; Req., Nov.
16, 1927, D.P. 1928.1.61; Pimms Ltd. v. Tallow Chandlers, 2 All E.R. 145 (1964). For
the abuse of an interdiction to install electric wires in connection with a burglar alarm
system, see Dame Leclerc v. Medalsy, [1968] B.R. 869. In Grinco Amusements Ltd.
v. Intercity Food Services, [1971] S.C. 276, the refusal of the lessor to allow the tenant
to erect a sign outside the rented premises was justified in the circumstances of the
case.
82. An Act Respecting the Lease of Things, Bill 2 (assented to Dec. 22, 1973)
(entry into force Jan. 1, 1974).
83. QuE. CIv. CODE art. 1622 (Jan. 1, 1974): "The lessee must permit the lessor to
ascertain the condition of the thing. The lessor must exercise this right in a reasonable
manner," See also Patent Act, R.S.C. 1970, ch. P-4, art. 67: "Abuse of rights under
patents (1) The attorney General or any person interested may at anytime after the
expiration of three years from the date of the grant of patent apply to the Commis-
sioner alleging in the case of that patent that there has been an abuse of the exclusive
rights thereunder and asking for relief under this Act. What amounts to Abuse (2) The
exclusive rights under a patent shall be deemed to have been abused in any of the
following circumstances: ... "
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rights is penetrating our law through the combined action of the
legislators and of the tribunals. It promotes the idea of reasonableness
without which justice would disagree with the law: summum jus,
summa injuria.
CONCLUSION
In a system of civil law, it is only natural to express formally in
a Code a rule which is constantly applied by the courts. In some
countries like Russia,84 Switzerland, 5 Germany, 6 and others,87 the
theory of the abuse of rights has been given legislative recognition.
France"8 and Quebec 8 have contemplated similar legislation.
84. U.S.S.R. CIv. CODE art. 1: "Civil rights are protected by the law, except in
those cases in which they are exercised in a manner contrary to their social and
economic purpose" (translation supplied).
85. SWISS Civ. CODE art. 2: "Chacun est tenu d'exercer ses droits et obligations
selon les rkgles de la bonne foi. L'abus manifeste d'un droit n'est pas protkgk par la
loi." Translation: "Every one is bound to exercise his rights and perform his obligations
according to the principles of good faith. The law does not protect the manifest abuse
of a right."
86. B.G.B. Art. 226: "The exercise of a right is illicit if its sole purpose is to harm
some other person." (translation supplied).
87. ETHIOPIAN CIV. CODE art. 2032: "(1) Une personne commet une faute
lorsqu'elle agit en vue de nuire d autrui, sans rechercher pour elle-mbme un profit
personnel. (2) Elie commet de mme une faute si, en connaissance de cause, elle cause
et autrui un dommage considkrable, en recherchant un profit personnel qui est sans
rapport avec ce dommage." Translation: "(1) A person commits a fault when he acts
with the purpose of harming some other person, without pursuing a personal benefit.
(2) He also commits a fault if, knowingly, he causes a serious damage, when seeking
after a personal benefit which is out of proportion with the damage."
88. COMMISSION DE RFORME DU CODE CIVIL FRANqAIS, REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1950-51,
at 26; Art. 31: "Tout acte ou tout fait qui excbde manifestement par l'intention de son
auteur, par son objet ou par les circonstances dans lesquelles il est intervenu, l'exercice
normal d'un droit, n'est pas protbg6 par la loi et engage 6ventuellement Ia responsabil-
ite de son auteur. La presente disposition ne s'applique pas aux droits qui, en raison
de leur nature ou en vertu de Ia loi peuvent etre exerc~s de facon discrktionnaire."
Translation: "Any act or any fact which manifestly exceeds by the intention of its
author, by its object or by the circumstances in which it took place, the normal exercise
of a right, is not protected by the law and eventually involves the responsibility of its
author. The above rule does not apply to the rights which, on account of their nature
or by virtue of the law can be exercised unconditionally." See also Projet du Code des
obligations et des contrats, COMMISSION FRANqAISE D'9TUDES DE L'UNION LEGISLATIVE
ENTRE LES NATIONS ALLItES ET AMIES (Paris 1929); Art. 74: "Toute faute qui cause un
dommage 6 autrui oblige celiu qui l'a commise a le rkparer. Doit galement r~paration
celui qui a causk un dommage" d autrui en exc6dant, dons l'exercice de son droit, les
limites fixdes par la bonne foi ou par le but en vue duquel ce droit lui a t6 confr6."
Translation: "Any fault which causes damage to another obliges its author to repair
it. Any person shall make compensation if he causes harm to another by exercising a
right in excess of the limits fixed by good faith or by the object for which the right
was conferred on him."
89. Draft submitted to the Civil Code Revision Office of Quebec: Art. A: "Chacun
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Whereas the civil law has a "penchant" for general principles, 0
the common law is wary of generalizations. The abuse of rights theory
also arouses the usual dislike of lawyers and judges to admit rules
which are not explicitly formulated in the law. Some consider that
what is to be feared most is not the abuse of rights, but the abuse of
the theory of abuse of rights. A certain suspicion tainted with some
hostility appears in the following remarks of Mr. H.C. Gutteridge:
The theory of abuse . . .may get out of hand and results in
serious inroads on individual rights, thus becoming an instru-
ment of dangerous potency in the hands of the demagogue and
the revolutionary. It resembles a drug which at first appears to
be innocuous, but may be followed by very disagreeable after
effects. Like all indefinite expressions of an ethical principle it is
capable of being put to an infinite variety of uses, and it may be
employed to invade almost any sphere of human activity for the
purpose of subordinating the individual to the demands of the
State. "
This "drug" has been used for almost a century in many civil law
countries and the "disagreeable after effects" have not yet been felt.
It has been used for worthy causes, and did not bring either revolution
or the disruption of the system of law. In Quebec, the theory of the
abuse of rights has been gaining ground constantly and its applica-
tion is getting more frequent; yet, there seems to be no known in-
stance where its application has resulted in an injustice or has been
met with disapproval.
Of course, the rejection of the theory of the abuse of rights by
common law countries does not mean that all abuses of rights are-
tolerated in those jurisdictions. Common law countries prefer to
est tenu d'exercer ses droits et d'exkcuter ses obligations selon les exigences de la bonne
foi." Translation: "Every one is bound to exercise his rights and perform his obligations
according to the requirements of good faith." Art. B: "Nul ne peut exercer un droit en
vue de nuire d autrui ou de mani~re d causer un prejudice hors de proportion avec le
profit qu'il recherche." Translation: "No one can exercise a right for the purpose of
harming some other person or in a manner to cause a prejudice disproportionate to the
benefit pursued." Art. C: "Nul ne peut exercer dans son int~rt propre les pouvoirs
qui lui sont conf~rs dans l'int~r~t d'autrui. Celui qui est charg6 d'administrer la chose
d'autrui est tenu d'agir en toute loyautk dans le seul intkrt du bn6ficiare." Transla-
tion: "No one can exercise in his own interest the powers which have been conferred
upon him in the interest of some other person." "The person who is charged with the
administration of the affair of another is bound to act in all fairness for the sole interest
of the beneficiary."
90. Thus, the theory of unjust enrichment has evolved from fragmentary applica-
tions to a broad fundamental principle.
91. Gutteridge, Abuse of Rights, 5 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 22, 43-44 (1933).
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adopt precise and fragmentary rules for particular abuses. Malicious
prosecution and abuse of legal process, nuisance, libel and slander,
are met with somewhat individual remedies, each one being governed
by its own rules. The situation of the common law has been thus
described by Professor John H. Crabb:
Abuse of rights does have some blood relations living among us,
but they do not bear the family name, and hence the kinship may
not be generally realized. Local branches of the family are apt to
go by the name of nuisance or malicious prosecution, among a few
others."
Is there a place for the theory of abuse of rights in Louisiana
Law? The writer will not be bold enough to venture any prediction
or even express a wish. But he hopes that it will not be inappropriate
to make the following observation. Already the Louisiana Civil Code
expressly condemns particular abuses of rights. 3 If and when the
Louisiana courts find it useful in the interest of justice to recognize
the theory of the abuse of rights, they will find in their own Code all
the corresponding articles which were used in Quebec and in France
to provide a legal basis for this theory. 4
92. Crabb, The French Concept of Abuse of Rights, 6 INTER-AMERICAN L.R. 1
(1964).
93. For instance article 621 (corresponding to article 480 of the Quebec Civil Code)
provides that the usufruct may cease by the abuse the usufructuary makes of his
enjoyment. See also LA. CIv. CODE art. 667.
94. Art. 2315 (1): "Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another
obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it." Art. 1901 (3): "Agreements . ..
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